Counter-UAS Technology & Industry Insights

Curated insights and analysis from military, government, industry, academia, and investment leaders on Counter-UAS, AI, autonomous systems, defense innovation, technology transition, testing, experimentation, and operational capability deployment.

What is meant by "Cost per Kill," or its friendlier, softer counterpart, "Cost Exchange Ratio"? It means this: for today's video game-trained warfighter, what does it cost to eliminate a target?

Simply put, warfare has become an economic exercise.

We no longer think in terms of total war as we did in WWII. We don't even think in terms of the limited wars of Korea or Vietnam. Today, the dynamic is simple: what is the cost to eliminate target X versus target Y?

Exquisite munitions cost millions in design, manufacturing, and delivery. If you use a million-dollar missile to eliminate a $5K threat, you will fail in multiple ways.

The economic story has been evolving over time.

In the 1980s, we were in the final stages of the Cold War but were still saddled with a procurement structure that revolved around a handful of large primes and smaller subcontractors. At the time, they all sought DoD awards through a much different acquisition model.

To maximize budget dollars, the DoD realized it needed to direct the primes that, for any program effort, they could not keep inventing bespoke components. Instead, they needed to reduce costs by purchasing commercial off-the-shelf components that could then be integrated with their own value-added capabilities.

Thus, the COTS initiative was pushed on the primes, essentially saying: buy already-developed products and wrap your own specific value around them.

It worked well and became one of the many factors that helped outpace the Soviet Union.

Today, we face a world of very different procurement models built around an alphabet soup of contract vehicles. It's a major change that must be recognized because it reflects today's reality.

So, how does this backstory apply to the current emphasis on Counter-UAS?

Drones are becoming more "missile-like" because advances in technology are blurring the traditional distinction between the two.

Historically, missiles have been one-time-use weapons designed to strike a target at high speed with sophisticated guidance. Drones, by comparison, have typically been reusable aircraft used for surveillance, reconnaissance, or carrying payloads.

Today, those distinctions are becoming less clear.

One-way attack drones: Designed to fly into a target and detonate, making them functionally similar to cruise missiles, often at a fraction of the cost.

Improved guidance: Modern drones use GPS, inertial navigation, terrain matching, computer vision, and, increasingly, AI to navigate accurately over long distances.

Greater range and speed: Some drones can now travel hundreds or even thousands of miles, and some are powered by jet engines rather than propellers.

Autonomy: Drones can increasingly operate with less direct human control, automatically navigating around obstacles or searching for targets.

Swarming: Multiple drones can work together to overwhelm air defenses, something that is difficult and expensive to achieve with traditional missiles.

The primary differences that remain are that most missiles are significantly faster, often supersonic or hypersonic, carry larger warheads, and are optimized for maximum speed and survivability.

Most drones remain slower and generally more vulnerable to air defenses, but they are also dramatically less expensive.

As technology continues to improve, we will likely see even greater overlap, with future systems combining the endurance and flexibility of drones with the speed and precision traditionally associated with missiles.

In this increasingly blurred world, it is prudent for drone developers to understand the threats they face. Equally important, missile manufacturers must recognize that they may eventually be replaced by swarms of low-cost drones performing many of the same missions at a dramatically lower cost exchange ratio.

Reflect for a moment on why this historical perspective matters to the Counter-UAS dialogue.

As missiles become drones and drones become missiles, the real story is how the counterpunch will scale to neutralize emerging threats within a dramatically different procurement landscape.

Don't get caught bringing a knife to a gunfight.

By Jim Falasco | Director of Strategic Business, Aerogear Telemetry

The introduction of armed unmanned aircraft fundamentally changed modern warfare.

When ISR platforms and precision strike capabilities converged, drones became more than reconnaissance assets. They became battlefield combatants. The impact was profound and has continued to evolve.

Recent conflicts have accelerated this trend. Low-cost First Person View (FPV) drones, employed individually or in swarms, have demonstrated that increasingly capable effects can be delivered at a fraction of the cost of traditional systems.

As offensive drone capabilities continue to proliferate, the Counter-UAS challenge grows alongside them.

This is not simply a technology problem.

It is also an operational, organizational, and economic problem.

Military organizations, governments, technology developers, operators, investors, and end users all have a role to play. Yet too often these stakeholders operate independently, discussing technologies without creating the partnerships and pathways necessary to field solutions at scale.

The next phase of Counter-UAS development will not be determined solely by who develops the best technology.

It will be determined by who can bring together the right stakeholders, align priorities, test solutions in realistic environments, and accelerate deployment.

The future belongs to organizations that can move beyond discussion and toward execution.

That is why deployment-focused initiatives and collaboration platforms matter.

The challenge is no longer understanding the threat.

The challenge is responding quickly enough to keep pace with it.

By Jean-Marc Sheitoyan | President, S4B Defense Corp.

Across defense and dual-use technology sectors, one assumption continues to persist:

If we develop better technology, operational advantage will follow.

In reality, technology is often the least constrained element of the system.

The greater challenge is integration.

Across Counter-UAS, autonomous systems, AI-enabled operations, and other emerging capabilities, organizations frequently encounter the same obstacles:

As technologies mature, the challenge shifts from invention to execution.

Success increasingly depends on the ability to align stakeholders, integrate capabilities, and coordinate delivery across complex ecosystems.

This requires more than project management.

It requires an integration layer capable of connecting organizations, clarifying roles, reducing friction, and maintaining focus on operational outcomes.

The organizations that gain advantage will not necessarily be those with access to the most advanced technologies.

They will be those that can integrate, adapt, and execute faster than their competitors.

In an era of rapidly evolving threats, operational capability is created not only by technology, but by the systems and relationships that enable technology to be deployed effectively.

The future of defense innovation belongs to execution.

By Jim Falasco | Director of Strategic Business, Aerogear Telemetry

Editor's Note: This article explores three representative operational environments that illustrate why Counter-UAS capabilities must be designed, tested, and deployed under real-world mission conditions.

Most drones that would be targets for any Counter-UAS system function off a Command & Control (C2) architecture that operates over secure links between the drone and the ground control system for flight commands and status. They have not been tested using high-bandwidth airborne telemetry systems (such as IRIG 106 PCM or advanced RF telemetry transmitters common at places like Eglin AFB or White Sands) or any other traditional test site. Instead, they typically rely on digital telemetry over their command-and-control link.

With that baseline established, for the most part the drone infrastructure itself is built on a relatively fragile foundation, creating an even more challenging scenario to counter. In essence, you are forced to counter unpredictability with predictability. The ultimate contaminated "Whack-a-Mole" game.

With those facts as background, let's examine three different scenarios that could become responses to current and future forms of non-dilutive funding or direct responses to actual contractor gaps. Any effective Counter-UAS solution must demonstrate test results across these three key 24/7, all-weather scenarios, reflecting current funding profiles and threat environments. While desert and European forest environments are also notable, they currently represent less relevant regions and funding profiles. Of course, all three scenarios are complicated by the challenge of getting capabilities to where they need to be for action.

For tankers, that challenge is especially acute. The C-17, along with any other transport platforms we could utilize, needs fuel to arrive in theater. The Air Force's refueling fleet consists primarily of hundreds of KC-135 Stratotankers and KC-46 Pegasus aircraft. Both are large platforms that generally require long runways and substantial support infrastructure, limiting the number of locations from which they can operate. Should major hubs such as Andersen Air Force Base on Guam or Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, Japan, be damaged or rendered temporarily unusable, tanker operations could be pushed hundreds or even thousands of miles farther from the fight, reducing efficiency and increasing operational risk.

So, we must deal with another paradox within the Counter-UAS dialogue.

With the above backdrop, I maintain the three hottest Counter-UAS growth markets consist of these topics:

As we look to the Indo-Pacific, we face two distinct scenarios: at-sea operations and land-based defense of shore-based assets at Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) or expeditionary airfields, alongside protracted jungle campaigns. Critical metrics include weather, sea state, and foliage. Moisture effects on sea and land, sea-state conditions, time of day or night, logistics of resupply, and simply getting to theater are just a few examples.

In a Pan-Pacific scenario, any Counter-UAS system would need to be packaged for transit over thousands of miles in harsh conditions and then require rapid, seamless setup to counter the aggressor's onslaught. Not only do the above metrics come into play, but packaging and setup issues also need to be solved. Even basic areas like power will be a challenge. Sorry, Mr. Nasty, my battery isn't the answer. It may get you a medal, but it won't save your life.

The urban Counter-UAS scenario is the most challenging because it involves not only natural obstacles but also man-made infrastructure. Narrow streets, power lines, and protected structures such as religious buildings or medical facilities create a demanding operational environment.

Pacific urban zones are likely to feature narrow streets that could function with an incremental twist on the IED tactics of the past. Mr. Nasty would place ordnance in the street attached to a cell phone. Upon the approach of an armored vehicle, he would call the phone and trigger the explosion.

Today, he would do the same thing, but coordinate it with a drone swarm attack. If you haven't thought through this scenario, your FOB or other asset is toast.

Of the three scenarios, this is the most challenging. Also consider the massive amount of RF interference from increased cellular emissions. Many of the metrics discussed above still apply, but the biggest differences involve dealing with buildings, shadows, heat signatures, and the urban population itself.

Think of the CNN moment where a Counter-UAS system brings a swarm of drones down onto a busload of nuns delivering supplies to an orphanage.

Weather affects both people and equipment. A frozen gimbal, ice on your optics, electrical lines frozen so hard they break. Then there is the human side: an exposed operator team waiting for an attack only to become frostbite victims.

Consider the additional logistics of transporting your Counter-UAS system to where it needs to be to counter the threat. While storage of spares and related support assets is a metric for the other two scenarios, the Arctic may prove to be the harshest environment of all.

All of these scenarios represent not only how a Counter-UAS system will need to be designed and deployed, but also how it must be tested for combat. Thinking you can simply get there without a true, traditional flight test campaign is fantasy and most likely won't even get you funded.

It also makes it clear that Counter-UAS systems will likely become mission-specific rather than general-purpose, otherwise the cost metric becomes prohibitive.

In the final analysis, each one of these scenarios will evolve daily, just as the IED battle did.

Thus, the reference to "Whack-a-Mole."

You change, then he changes, then you counter in an endless cycle.

Thus, the requirement for a true flight test campaign isn't just about flying. In addition, all three scenarios are clearly referenced in the DoW document, which states that we have plenty of data but little information.

Think about that concept.

With that as a foundational plank, how can we even begin to network range assets?

Feature Article by Aaron Paseur, Retired U.S. Navy SEAL, and Jared Febbroriello, Industry Expert in Security and Government Contracting

Originally published in COTS Journal. Reproduced with permission.

This article discusses various aspects of COTS from a different perspective – through the eyes of the Military End-User and real-world, combat environment. It also provides an Industry viewpoint of where this must evolve to foster National Security, the protection of the War Fighter and perpetuate our Military superiority.

The decision to integrate Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology into military applications marked a significant shift from traditional bespoke solutions designed exclusively for defense purposes. This paradigm shift was driven by the rapidly accelerating pace of technological change in the commercial sector. This article is not designed to discuss the inherent advantages/ disadvantages of COTS – rather it is to provide a perspective from a Military end-user and combat/battlefield viewpoint.

Improvements in additive manufacturing and rapid prototyping technologies offer advanced capabilities that even small commercial teams can now leverage to maintain a strategic edge in their product development. These capabilities (if available historically) would have been cost-prohibitive.

If time is the most valuable commodity, then speed is the great equalizer. Inexpensive generative AI, machine learning and other emerging technologies will continue to accelerate development, driven more by the vision and work ethic of the development team than by resource availability.

Yet, with all these advancements, the knowledge gap between commercial design teams and military end-users continues to widen. A good example of the blending of COTS product solution and real-world, combat requirements is General Micro Systems (GMS) fully-featured, wearable Spider Man Pack for real-time “tip of the spear” image and signalprocessing (see sidebar for details).

The adoption of COTS products comes with a complex set of challenges for the military end-user. Most COTS products, while cuttingedge and cost-effective are not designed to survive demanding military environments and may cause casualties when signals are detected and intercepted by an adversary.

Operational realities necessitate a comprehensive pre-evaluation and modifications to COTS products prior to fielding, which can negate their utility value or frustrate the purpose of adopting these technologies to a real-world combat environment. This process requires experienced military end-users with broad knowledge of sensitive military initiatives, programs and target applications that have considerable combat experience.

In the era of 5th generation warfare, the lines between commercial and military combatants continue to blur. The rapid evolution of radio direction finding technology, drone warfare, loitering munitions, smart artillery, and the increasingly autonomous kill chain have changed warfare forever. The difference between life and death on the battlefield is now determined by an anomalous radio signature, a suspicious data pattern or even simply the wrong SIM card in the wrong phone. These modern tactics first began in 2014 when the Gerasimov Doctrine was applied in Ukraine. However, an overemphasis on technology instead of tactics may be a miscalculation.

While technology and tactics are inextricably linked, history is replete with examples of technologically superior forces being defeated by an underdog. From the British Red Coats and their “Brown Bess” Musket to Eugene Stoner’s development of the M-16 in Vietnam, the lesson seems to be that great technology rarely defeats great tactics.

The first shots of 5th generation warfare were not fired from a gun; they began with advanced cyber tactics used to disrupt Ukrainian communications and infrastructure in February 2014. The world woke up to a new pervasive Universal Threat Environment bolstered by misinformation propagated through hacked information systems. These emerging information warfare tactics sowed confusion and economic pressure without provoking a full-scale, conventional war. Networked sensors, integrated surveillance, and precise targeting systems were used to effect rapid tactical strikes and establish overmatch on the battlefield. OSINT bolstered by poor operational security was leveraged to target the family members of commanding officers, who were then socially engineered to elicit electronic communications that were rapidly traced to GPS coordinates for a precision airstrike on the officer in the field.

Eight years and five trillion dollars of NDAA appropriations later, we continue to believe that all we need to win the day is more money and better technology.

Our armed forces are not exempt from the universal laws of time, speed, and intelligent resource management. Just like every other organism in the known universe, our military will either adapt to these natural laws of technological evolution or perish. Thus, the rapid integration of COTS technologies into military systems is not an eventuality but a tactical certainty.

Intelligent and effective leveraging of COTS is the only way for our modern armed forces to maintain a technological edge with respect to military-grade equipment. As the pace of innovation continues to accelerate, forces that do not capitalize on the latest technological innovations will become extinct. This is a harsh reality that the operations side of the defense community, where the cost of failure is paid for in blood, has already begun to witness first-hand.

A Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) sent to theater costs approximately $6,000,000, while a Shahed-136 loitering drone costs approximately $30,000. This economic disparity exemplifies a 5th generation warfare tactic of economic death by 1,000 cuts. The real challenge lies in redefining the long-term strategic vision of military command objectives and a false worldview that the economics of warfare are irrelevant to the mission. This is where the long-term strategic vision of commercial leadership objectives and the development of COTS can play a key role.

Feature Article by Ed Hennessy | CEO, Performance Marketing Group

Originally published in Commercial UAV News. Reproduced with permission.

There are many commercial drone companies who want to get a piece of the Defense Market in order to extend their portfolio. This makes sense, as securing a position in defense-related, programs can provide a predictable and sustainable source of business and compensate for unexpected swings in the business cycle.

According to Fortune Magazine (Business Insights), the US Military drone market will grow from $11 Billion in 2021 to $26 Billion in 2028 which is a 12.78% CAGR (compound annual growth rate). However, migrating to the Defense and Military Market is not a simple translation of what has worked in other market segments. To tackle the tough and complex Defense sector, a company needs to understand the ground rules, and make the right moves to become a serious player.

We have seen companies over the years declare a commitment to crack the Defense and Military Market, only to discover two years out that they discontinued their efforts or abandoned the market completely. Some of these organizations gained early success (by grabbing low-hanging fruit) or selected to develop this market segment for the wrong reasons.

Entering the Defense Market requires strategic focus, relatively deep investment pockets, patience, tolerance, and an appetite and drive to run the course—no matter what materializes. The common denominator is that companies want to gain content on Deployable Programs (a program that reaches full production for a multiyear cycle—usually 7 to 10+ years).

Although these sorts of Deployable Programs are the attraction, it is important not to overlook the fundamentals of the program lifecycle, budget/funding allocations (top-line defense level), priority shifts/competing interests, fierce competition, and the realities of coping with the government and military machine. Securing a position in a deployable government defense program is a long-term, multiphase arrangement and there are no shortcuts.

Years ago, we conducted research to understand and define the basic model utilized by major defense contractors/integrators that grew up in the Defense and Military Market. Our initial objective was not to translate this model as a one-size-fits-all solution for small-to-medium sized companies, but over time, it became clear that the elements of the methodology/process we defined were essential for success for any firm.

Without taking this approach, we would have wandered aimlessly and taken years to understand a winning formula or never gotten there. Regardless of size, companies can retrofit and apply a similar approach, taking their business priorities, technology capabilities, resource constraints, budget availability and organizational make-up into account. The mindset and skills, within the organization, are key. It is important to remember that a square peg cannot fit in a round hole—at least not without some adjustments. This also applies to attempting to translate the requirements of a defense game plan into your core business, particularly if your experience base is grounded in the Commercial Market.

The following sections of this report walk you through what should be considered if you are planning or thinking about breaking into the Defense and Military Market.

Feature Article by Ed Hennessy | CEO, Performance Marketing Group

Originally published in Unmanned Systems Technology. Reproduced with permission.

In the following opinion piece, Edmond M. Hennessy CEO at PMGResults examines the cross-translation of technologies from crewed to uncrewed platforms, and looks at how the miniaturization curve and the ingenuity of designers and practicing engineers is making this a reality.

It’s clear that drone proliferation is gaining momentum and impacting every target segment (cross-industry) and finding its way to a never-ending range of applications.

Within the defense industry, drones are changing the face of modern, military warfare. One can track the progression and evolution of uncrewed vehicles, sUAS and drones back to DARPA development programs conducted in the late 80’s – early 90’s – which became notable platforms like Global Hawk, Predator, Shadow, and many others.

This movement has taken shape globally, with MODs (by country) investing in the development of drone platforms and capabilities – with the objective of making them combat-ready and in some cases, lethal. The state of drone utilization today is astounding with drones having a play in all-sectors including air, sea, ground and space.

This has been highlighted by the “miniaturization curve” and continuous innovation demonstrated by drone providers – both platform developers and enabling technology sources.

Industry experts indicate that the last major breakthrough and adoption of technology is reflective of the invention and acceptance of the Internet. This may be true, although drone utilization is certainly having its effect on changing and reshaping the world.

Along with the drone movement, we can see advances and breakthroughs in aerodynamic designs, propulsion systems, sensor-based systems, camera technology, communications/network systems, battery technology, etc. – all with an eye on how to design and integrate these technologies into ever-increasing, constrained spaces without compromising overall capability, performance and the stringent demands of the target environment and application.

There is also an interesting translation taking place – with technologies proven and mature with crewed vehicles now being transitioned to uncrewed vehicles. Granted, it is not a one-for-one replacement, although this is where the miniaturization curve and engineering ingenuity and prowess thrive. This is deemed “The great parallel” and a movement that is predictable, given the commonality of mission plans and mission-critical applications, between these platforms. This is also reflective of the co-existence and collaboration these platforms/vehicles will have in real-world, combat environments.

One can see this played out in several areas – within the Military Doctrine, as a conscious initiative (with 3x budget/funding allocation than in previous years), within cross-military lines and with technology development hubs and other Government/Military agencies – leading the charge to set the tone and get this done.

That includes opening-up the floodgates to small, innovative technology companies to get enrolled – through SBIR/STTR and BAA programs – including the work being done by OTCs.

By Jim Falasco | Director of Strategic Business, Aerogear Telemetry

In age of sail close combat looked like above. Today as autonomous water-based systems become more common, defending them against drone attacks is becoming an increasingly important concern. The challenge differs from traditional Counter-UAS operations: aerial UAS may be harder to field, while water-based autonomous assets can be harder to defeat once deployed. Counter-UAS (C-UAS) technologies are therefore being adapted for use against autonomous surface vessels (ASVs) and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), especially as naval forces confront explosive drone boats and swarming maritime threats. Applicable C-UAS technologies include:

A key challenge is that fully autonomous vessels may continue their missions even after communications are jammed. In these cases, soft-kill electronic warfare techniques may not be enough, making detection and physical defeat more critical than in many aerial UAS scenarios. This is where telemetry, flight safety, and C-UxS technologies are beginning to converge. Organizations with experience in telemetry, RF systems, data links, and range safety may find opportunities in the growing counter-USV and counter-swarm market, even if their historical focus has been missile test support. As a result, many defense firms are assessing how traditional telemetry and test-range capabilities can support broader autonomous and counter-autonomous systems missions.